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CONSIDERATIONS ON THE REFORM IN 
THE POWER SECTOR  





The reform of a single player power sector (i.e. a natural monopoly) into a multiple-
players power market brings to the clients not only the benefits of competition but also 
the costs of complexity. In between the two, an optimal number of players is found, 
corresponding to the minimum price of power to the clients. Considering time as the 
third dimension, the optimum curve becomes a potential surface on which the 
evolution of the market entities is seen as oscillations (mergers and unbundling) along 
the valley of the minimum price. Every oscillation triggers a price burst, which is 
detrimental to the clients. To avoid this, the role of the regulator is better defined in the 
sense of smoothing the transition from monopoly to market. The example of the US 
and of the EU power sectors evolution is relevant here. In the above approach, long 
range competition resulting from the future opening of power markets in Europe, or 
from the penetration, 70 years ago, of the interconnection technology in USA, is 
compared with the short range (local) competition. Finally, the price limits are 
determined, which ensure that (i) the new entrants on the market are not eliminated 
and (ii) the market avoids oscillations (chaotic behavior), which may drastically shock 
a non-resilient economy. A case study calculation is made for a transition economy 
(Romania). 
Key words: unbundling power monopoly, deterministic chaos, power markets, 
optimization 
JEL classification: C5, C62, D4, D5. 
Introduction 
A lot is happening these days in the power industries both in Europe (East and West) 
and in the United States, Australia, etc. The main trend is toward the change of the 
monopoly dominated national power sectors into power markets. The benefits of the 
competition implemented through this change are measured by the decrease, in the 
long run, in the price of energy to the clients. Alas, there is no such thing as a free 
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lunch! That is why we try to assess here the price to pay for the benefits of 
competition that result from the costs of the increased complexity of the market. Can 
this cost be minimized? Is there an optimal structure of the market which results from 
the interplay between the benefits of competition and the costs of complexity? Bellow, 
we are trying to answer these questions, first by defining the behavior of the process 
and, second, by building conceptual tools that may allow the determination of the best 
strategies to face the new power market. The role of the regulator is presented in the 
light of these strategies. 
General comments on (market - monopoly - market) cycles 
From the point of view of the information, the cycle of passing from a market economy 
to a monopoly dominated one (the outmost extreme is a centrally planned one) and 
back to a market economy shows a hysteresis effect.  The passage from market to 
planned economy is done by nationalization, which triggers a process of information 
flow from the enterprises level in the market to the centrally-planning entity.  In time, 
no enterprise will know any longer who are the manufacturers of the raw materials and 
who are the clients for its products, but they will only know that raw materials are 
taken from a certain store house and that products are to be delivered to another 
specified store house.  It is only the central planner who will have full, real knowledge 
about the market. 
To reverse this process, i.e., to go from planned economy to market, one cannot, 
simply, reverse the nationalization action into a liberalization one.  If the liberalization 
is done before having re-introduced all the market information back to the level of the 
enterprises, one will not get a market economy.  The only thing obtained is a 
conglomerate of disconnected enterprises and a number of market information 
holders, which will use the information to get rich fast.  This fast enrichment comes 
from a high transaction cost resulting precisely from the lack of information.  Situations 
may be encountered where there is almost a monopoly on the transaction costs 
established by the market information holder. 
From power sector to power market  
At present, the power sector in some economies is acting as an “economic sector”, 
where the state is managing through the help of a natural monopoly instrument. 
Any natural monopoly in power has developed historically concentrating on the 
benefits resulted from the economy of scale.  This concept has been reflected both on 
the supply side and on the demand one.  On the supply side, the nominal power of 
power plants has continuously increased, and the fuel, whether imported or bought 
from the country, was taken in bulk, which allowed negotiation of lower prices.  On the 
demand side, the interconnection technology was extensively used to create the grid 
for transport and distribution, while more and more customers were connected 
increasing the scale of the market. Also, regarding the safety of supply, black-outs 
experienced in operation have triggered measures resulting in a significant 
improvement of the grid resilience. 
Of course, passing to a real market needs competition.  Outsiders may come in, both 
on the supply and on the demand side.  This requires a favorable legal environment  Considerations on the Reform in the Power Sector 
 
−  Romanian Journal of Economic Forecasting – 3/2006
  
53
   
carefully thought out to lower risk perception.  The institutionalization that follows will 
definitely have to create a regulator for the power market, as well as a system 
operator to manage the power pool. 
The costs of complexity  
An important remark has to be made here: i.e., the fact that in a completely 
unbounded power generation, part of the benefit of scale, regarding the bulk supply of 
fuels, is lost.  The sum of the costs of numerous smaller quantities of fuel (at higher 
prices) will result greater at the macro economic level, than the cost of larger 
quantities bought at smaller prices.  Of course, this will happen unless the competition 
is implemented in the fuel supply too, by, for instance, diversifying the local and the 
foreign sources of supply. This situation is raising an important comment which has to 
be made regarding the costs of transaction and the costs of complexity versus the 
benefits of scale and of competition. 
Creating a market for power leads to having a large number of competitors.  This is 
bringing the advantage of competition to the newly defined 'market clients', coming 
from the former 'sector customers'. At the same time, there is a loss in the benefits of 
scale, which is felt at the macro economic level (e.g., in the impact of the total cost of 
fuel on the country’s balance of payments).  This loss comes from the increased 
complexity of the market and can, thus, be associated to a measure of the cost of 
complexity. The cost of complexity may thus be regarded as a marginal transaction 
cost depending on the increase in the number of power market players. As shown 
bellow, other mechanisms add up to this cost. 
Going to the extremes, one may see that the greater the number of market players, 
the greater the competition will be, lowering the price to the clients.  However, the 
greater the market complexity, the higher the complexity cost (e.g., by loss of scale 
benefits, transaction costs and/or other mechanisms), which tends to increase the 
price to the clients (the increase could be direct or indirect through the macro 
economic influences). 
Since two opposite trends have been identified for the price to the client, we may 
define an optimum price corresponding to a market complexity where competition 
benefits are balanced by the cost of complexity. 
A qualitative behavior of the process is shown in Figure 1 below. 
As more players are penetrating the market the costs of complexity accumulate.  The 
processes that generate the cost of complexity are, in a non-exhaustive list, the 
following (the estimated figures are given for the cases of various countries, based on 
the mentioned international sources): 
1.  The loss of scale benefits for the fuel supply. We think that due to the size of 
the coal mines, or of the oil   tankers, or oil fields, the quantity of fuel delivered 
is covering the fuel storage capacity of one power plant. Thus, the loss of scale 
benefits for the fuel supply may not be substantial in the price of fuel if the size 
of the generating entities is suitably chosen. Diversification of fuel sources may 
also contribute positively. The estimations made for UK show a loss of benefits 
as compared to the pro-CEGB situation of USD 2.1 billion for 15 years (1995-
2010) (Newbery and Pollitt, 1997). Institute of Economic Forecasting 
 





   
Figure 1 
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competition
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2.  The need for an information network which has to be set in place at the level of 
each player in the market, as well as for the whole market. The costs of this 
information system are substantial and we may notice that the lack of such a 
system in the market is liable to produce losses which may add to the cost.  
Immediately after the unbundling in UK there were significant investments in IT 
development and implementation (e.g., companies like National Power report 
figures close to 450 mill. pounds) (source: National Power and UK Electricity 
Association). 
3. Along with the information there is a need for more metering.  Setting up 
manufacturing facilities and installation and maintenance capabilities for that 
equipment adds other costs. Nevertheless, this situation is creating jobs which 
may help to absorb the redundant personnel from the power entities, reducing 
the social conversion costs.  Just for information, in Norway the charge for 
metering is USD 360/year (Livik et al., 1998). 
4.  Creating and maintaining a market mechanism, e.g., a power pool, as well as a 
regulatory agency, represents costs which have got to be also sustained. We 
will discuss later, in more detail, the issue of regulation. To the costs of founding 
and operating a regulatory agency, there are also some effects on the price of 
power which are reported (Navarro, 1996) as determining the firms in some EU 
countries to pay 50% more for their electricity than do their American 
counterparts. It is important to note here that passing from a monopoly to a 
deregulated market cannot be done without a regulatory body, which bears 
costs and gains stability in the transition. The approach developed here is 
aiming at reducing these costs by defining in a better context the role of the 
regulator.  Considerations on the Reform in the Power Sector 
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5. The professional relocation of the personnel laid off from the previous 
monopoly, as well as the training of the remaining ones in order to increase 
their competitiveness is bringing more costs into the picture. The order of 
magnitude could be roughly 2.8 billion pounds for a 15 years period - as 
estimated for the UK (Newbery and Pollitt, 1997). 
6. Finally, we mention here the transaction cost. It usually results from the 
increasing number of intermediaries doing the retail wheeling in the market. For 
example (Conger, 1996), the electric bill of a New Hampshire residential 
customer includes the following charges: 
 
Description of Charge  Quantity  Rate  Amount 
Meter Charge    9.16        9.16 
Transmission Charge  786 kWh  .00389  3.06 
Distribution Charge  786 kWh  .01900  14.93 
Acquisition Premium  786 kWh  .02970  23.34 
Stranded Cost  250 kWh  .02069  5.17 
 536  kWh  .06252  33.61 
Pilot Participation Credit  786 kWh  -.01480  -11.63 
PSNH Energy Charge  786 kWh  .03300  25.94  
Total Current Charges      $103.58 
 
Also, transaction costs are brought in by the new power projects; being estimated at 
5-10% of the total project costs (Klein, So and Shin, 1997) - i.e., USD 2 billion to 
USD3 billion a year assuming that investments worldwide exceed USD 35 billion a 
year. Most of these costs ultimately will be borne by consumers and taxpayers, 
although investors may have to swallow the consequences of serious miscalculations. 
Where are the benefits which may compensate for these costs, i.e. the benefits of 
competition? They are coming from the following trends: 
1.  The increase in efficiency stemming from a better organization and 
management of the market players; we estimate it to generate a price decrease 
by around. 10%, (source: UK Electricity Association- 1994; O. Chisari  et al., 
1997). 
2.  The increase in the technological efficiency resulting from the implementation of 
modem technologies; the assessed value based on the British and Argentinean 
data is near 30% decrease in the toe/GWh (see sources at point 1 above). 
3.  The competitiveness effect of the market on the supply side; it is estimated to 
reduce prices of electricity by about 10% (the same sources). 
4.  The use of the scale benefits by the users which are joining in order to increase 
the scale of the demand, thus lowering the price, may bring another around 
10% reduction (same sources as above, plus K. Conger - APPA 1996). Institute of Economic Forecasting 
 





   
Two other topics should be mentioned here: the security of supply and the need for 
guarantees by the state, which will foster the inflows of capitals to the power sector. 
A good example of the influence that the government’s energy investments 
guarantees policy has on the speed of the reform is the Nuclear Power Plant at 
Temelin, in the Czech Republic.  This case evolved as follows:  CEZ - the Power 
Company of the country - was in a process of spinning off its generation. At the same 
time, the Czech Government decided to finalize the NPP Temelin project.  A foreign 
company came in with a good offer but which required the state guarantee. The 
Czech Government did not want to give that guarantee (in order not to increase its 
already large foreign debt) and asked CEZ to provide it. At this moment, the 
downsizing of the company stopped, because CEZ had to have enough revenues to 
be able to cover the required guarantee. Thus, the generation which was taken away 
amounted to merely 20% of the total. The process may continue after the Temelin 
plant will be finished, (source: Pro-Democratia Foundation, 1997). 
A conclusion of the story above is that the creation of a market of power, with several 
smaller players, is only possible if the government or any designated entity assumes 
the costs of guarantees for investments in power projects.  If this is not happening, 
then, either the size of the power companies must be large enough to sustain 
guarantees, or the size of the new power projects (e.g. power plants) built into that 
economy will be downsized. Guarantees represent an increased cost to the 
government, but they buy out the future existence of the power system’s operational 
capability. 
The other important topic we wanted to mention was the safety of supply. From fuel 
abundance on the market, coming from diversified sources, to the availability of power 
at any time, to the existence of a continuous distribution service and appropriate 
maintenance, this involves various economic layers working in inter-correlation. 
We may identify the: 
1.  Physical   layer of the technologies used to convert energy; 
2.  Information   layer of the data related to the system operation, finance, etc.; 
3.  Commercial   layer of the actions ensuring the inter-relations among the parties 
involved (generators, operators, clients, etc.); 
4.  Financial   layer of the flows of money serving, among other, to maintain the 
working capability of the physical layer, etc. 
It is important to notice here the fact that the nominal operation of the power system is 
influenced by the processes within each layer, while the safety of supply depends 
strongly on the inter-correlation among the layers. 
Considering the four layers one may define the safety of supply in relation to each of 
them. Thus: 
•  at the physical layer, the main parameter to consider is the reliability of the 
technologies used - it is the only remedy against low frequency high 
consequence events like a total black-out;  
•  at the information layer, it is the timeliness of the data allowing fast quality 
decisions. The interplay of information with technology may better help to avoid 
the low frequency high consequence events.  Considerations on the Reform in the Power Sector 
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Moving toward the commercial and the financial layers we enter the field of high 
frequency low consequence events. The protection against these can be achieved 
through: 
•  contract design to minimize risk (this also depends on the market structure) at 
the commercial level and; 
•  the set up of a sound insurance policy for covering and distributing risk. A 
captive insurance company may generate some more financial resources which 
could be used for direct investments or/and guarantees. 
Determining the optimal structure of the market 
We will consider now the optimum resulting from the two opposite trends described 
above. Let us take the case of the EU directive. The discussion following is only a very 
rough attempt to put some figures in the qualitative trends explained above. 
In the graph bellow, it was assumed that the power sector will be segregated as 
various entities including generation, transport, and distribution. We did not consider 
the ownership of these entities but, they may include, e.g., a state owned nuclear 
power generator, independent power producers, public utilities, etc., the same 
variation being possible on the distribution side, including the brokers. The number of 
these entities depends on the number of clients, which is measured by the percentage 
of the market which is opened to competition. 
The important assumptions, related to the costs of complexity, are summarized 
bellow: 
1.  the transaction cost increases with the number of entities in the market; 
2. the metering costs are also sensitive to the number of clients in the open 
market; 
3.  other costs vary slightly with the number of players and may be considered as 
initial costs required by the setting up of the market;  
4.  the dependence of the variable costs of complexity on the number of entities is 
assumed to be linear, i.e., 2% of power price increase for every new entity 
coming to the market. This is a very rough approximation and in Appendix 1 a 
more detailed discussion is made on this topic. Also, we assume that the 
number of companies acting into the power market is proportional with the 
percentage of market opened to competition.  
In these conditions, if we consider the timing of the EU directive, in terms of market 
opening, and the expected decrease in power prices (Chevalier, 1998), we get the 
graph presented in Figure 2. 
One may see that with the very rough assumptions made above the resulting demo 
optimal percentage of market opening is 33%. Of course, this figure should be taken 
only for demonstration purposes. A lot of analysis is required in order to determine a 
real optimal value and to see how this optimum varies with the different components 
of the costs and of the benefits and how the costs of complexity could be lowered in 
order to take advantage of the competition benefits. However, since this is outside our 
scope we will, instead, make some considerations on the time evolution of the market, 
concentrating on the aspect of regulation. Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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Time evolution of the market entities 
Let us look at Figure 1, to which we add a third dimension, i.e., the time. The optimum 
curve becomes a surface having a valley of optimum. In this representation, the time 
evolution of the number of the entities in the market, which could increase by new 
entrants or decrease (e.g., by merging, buy-out, etc.), is seen as a curve oscillating on 
the two sides of the optimum valley, eventually converging to it.  If we project this 
curve on the two planes, namely that describing the time evolution of the number of 
enterprises and the one of the price, we see that each change in the number of 
entities is leading only to the increase in the price over the optimal value. These price 
shocks can only be detrimental to the clients. To mitigate them, a new special entity is 
needed in the market, i.e., the regulator. Considering this approach, the role of the 
regulator becomes better defined in relation to the market evolution. The regulator 
must speed up the convergence time to the market optimum by diminishing the 
number of oscillations of the market entities’ number. It should also ensure a smoother 
penetration of the newcomers. By doing this, the number of price shocks to the market 
is diminished, with a beneficial effect to the economy as a whole. 
Another behavior that is resulting from the interpretation above is concerning the case 
of the border elimination in the European Union. This is creating more competition, 
which leads to reducing the local markets power costs to the clients, without actually 
increasing too much the cost of local complexity. This leads to a displacement of the 
minimum in the price-entities surface toward the left, i.e., toward fewer entities in the 
market. This shows that the expected effect of the overall European grid opening will 
be a merging of power entities in the local markets. The same effect in the USA is 
given by the interconnection technology penetration, which led the private power 
entities to merge, being exposed to more fierce, long range competition, while the 
local entities did not merged to the same level, being confined to service mainly their 
local areas, without being interested in long range competition.  Considerations on the Reform in the Power Sector 
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Figure 3 






To substantiate the above statement, we give bellow the evolution of the number of 
entities, in the United States power sector, along the years. The occurrence of 
regulation (FERC) and of the interconnection technology, have had a strong damping 
effect on the public utilities oscillation and led to the smooth penetration of the late-
comers rural power cooperatives. 
Figure 4 
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One comment to make here relates to the fact that, by contrast to the USA at the end 
of the 19
th century, the power sectors of today’s Europe are not starting from nothing. 
The companies are not forming themselves as the new technology penetrates but, the 
existing natural monopolies in power are segregating and the whole market is 
restructuring.  
To illustrate this trend, let us present here the evolution of the number of companies in 
Hungary, Poland and Romania during the period of power monopolies unbundling in 
those economies. 
Figure 5 


































One may notice the fact that Poland unbundled from the beginning into many 
companies inducing large complexity costs that drive merging, while Romania went 
smoothly avoiding shocks. Hungary is a special case where the initial market structure 
was a single buyer (government owned) that was changing latter on to market with the 
associated economic shocks. 
What are the limits of the speed of penetration of the private power companies on a 
monopoly dominated market?  Based on the argument of the economic resilience 
(capability of an economy to absorb shocks and still operate) there are, presently, two 
approaches: 
•  The small steps approach, which tries to minimize the shock by distributing it in 
time. The possible criticism of this approach is that by taking small steps one 
may never reach the new better structure in a finite amount of time. The risk of 
the privates’ extinction is very high in this case. 
•  The sudden change approach, which tries to minimize the shock by reducing it 
to only one - even if relatively large - instead of having to suffer several smaller, 
successive ones. The critics here are related to the capability of a weak 
economy to resist this first shock without being severely damaged. One shock 
could be beneficial, if it would take the market directly to the optimal structure. If 
this is not the case, the market will tend to its optimal structure inducing, thus, 
subsequent shocks which add up to the first.  Considerations on the Reform in the Power Sector 
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The following is an attempt to identify a third way out, where the penetration may be 
smooth enough, through the limited involvement of a regulator. This may be done 
through the identification, and use, of the non-linearity in the market behavior. 
Non-linear effects in market penetration 
Recent years have revealed the possibility to apply a number of newly found 
mathematical objects, like 'deterministic chaos', 'catastrophe theory', 'bifurcation 
theory', etc., to the description of economic systems' behavior. 
These instruments have been proved to be more accurate descriptors of several types 
of non-linear dynamic systems, arriving, thus, at the identification of certain specific 
mechanisms by which the outcome of complex, 'chaotic', behavior may be predicted. 
One such mechanism is shown to occur in the process of privatization of monopolies 
or, equivalently, it may be applied in the transition of the centrally-planned economies 
to market ones. 
Some comments on the rate of privatization and its role in producing chaotic evolution 
are concluding the paper. 
Appendix 2 is giving some comments about the earlier dynamic models in economics 
and about the essentials of ‘deterministic chaos’ behavior generated by quadratic 
phase diagrams. This behavior occurs also in various economic situations. 
Quadratic phase diagrams in economics 
Let us analyze the way the "hill-shaped" dynamic relationships can arise in economics 
starting with a simple example showing this pattern: 
Consider the relationship between a firm's profits and its advertising budget decision.  
Suppose that without any expenditure on advertising the firm cannot sell anything.  As 
advertising outlay rises, total net profit first increases, then gradually levels off and 
finally begins to decline, yielding the traditional hill-shaped profit curve. If Pt represents 
total profit in period t and yt is total advertising outlay, Pt can, for illustration, be 
expressed as Pt=ayt(1- yt). If the firm devotes a fixed proportion, b, of its current profit 
to advertising outlays in the following period so that yt+1=bPt, the first equation is 
transformed into our basic chaos one with w=a.b. 
The reason the slope of the phase graph turns from positive to negative in this case is 
clear and widely recognized.  Even if an increase in advertising outlay always raises 
the total revenue, after a point its marginal net profit yield becomes negative and, 
hence, the phase diagram exhibits a hill shaped curve. 
Giving it some thought, one may see why the time path of yt can be expected to be 
oscillatory.  Suppose the initial level of advertising, yo , is an intermediate one that 
yields a high profit figure Po . That will lead to a large (excessive) advertising outlay y1 
in the next period, thereby bringing down the value of profit figure P1, and, in turn, it 
will reduce advertising again and raise profit and so on ad infinitum. 
The thing to be noticed about this process is that it gives good reason to expect the 
time paths of profit and advertising expenditures to be oscillatory.  However, it does 
not give us any reason to expect that these time paths need either be convergent or 
perfectly replicatory.  This is an example of how chaotic behavior patterns can arise. Institute of Economic Forecasting 
 





   
Another example has been provided in the theory of productivity growth (Baumol and 
Wolff, 1983).  It involves the relationship between the rate of productivity growth (Pt) 
and the level of R&D expenditures by private industry (r).  Obviously a rise in r can be 
expected to increase Pt. However, since research can be interpreted as a service 
activity with a more or less fixed labor component, its costs will be raised by 
productivity growth in the reminder of the economy and the resulting stimulus to real 
wages.  This, in turn, will cut back the quantity of R&D demanded.  The result, as a 
formal model easily confirms, will be a cycle with high productivity rates leading to 
high R&D prices, which restrict the next period's productivity growth, and so reduce 
R&D prices, and so on.  If R&D costs ultimately increase disproportionately with 
increases in productivity growth it is clear that the relation Pt+1= f(Pt) can generate the 
sort of hill-shaped phase graph that is consistent with a chaotic regime. 
Another model that can generate cyclical or chaotic dynamics is a standard growth 
model of Solow type in which the propensity to save out of wages is lower than that for 
profits. Suppose that at low levels of capital stock K one obtains increasing marginal 
returns to increased capital and the elasticity of substitution of labor for capital is 
initially low; but diminishing returns eventually set in and the elasticity of substitution 
moves the other way.  Then, total profits can rise, first, relative to total wages, but later 
profits may fall both relative to wages and even absolutely. This can generate a hill-
shaped relationship between Kt+1 and Kt as rising Kt at first elicits rising savings and 
then, eventually, depresses them as profits fall. 
Other similar models may be constructed exhibiting chaotic behavior. The one 
following relates to the privatization of a monopoly (Purica, 1994). 
Privatization of a monopoly 
The characteristic total revenue (Rm) of a monopolist is another typical case of a hill-
shaped process: at zero quantity demanded (Q) total revenue is zero, while at a price 
of zero, Rm is zero although the quantity demanded is positive.  The slope of any line 
from the origin to the Rm(Q) curve is the marginal price of the item at the 
corresponding output level. 
If we consider now the perfect competition market, it is obvious that the total revenue 
Rc will have a linear dependence on the quantity demanded. 
The process of passing from the monopolistic market to the perfect competition one is 
characterized by the shift of the total quantity demanded from the monopolistic 
production to the private one. 
Thus, in the year yt the monopolistic production dominates the market providing all the 
quantity demanded and obtaining a total revenue given by the parabolic equation 
Rm(Q) = m.Q(l-Q) 
where Q is the ratio between the actual demand and the total potential demand of the 
economy. 
Let us suppose that in the next year, yt+l, part of the demand Q(i.e. rQ) is provided 
from private sources, which gives a total perfect competition revenue Rc=p.(r.Q), with 
p being the price of the private production.  Considerations on the Reform in the Power Sector 
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Further on, we may consider that the perfect competition revenue Rc(t+l) is 
proportional to the pervious year's monopolistic revenue: q.Rm (t); where q is an 
indication of the rate of privatization. 
Resuming the suppositions above one obtains: 
 R m(t) = m.Q(l-Q)   (1)   
 R c(t) = p.(r.Q)   (2)   
 R c(t+l) = q.Rm(t)   (3)   
From the equations (1) and (2) we have 
 R m(t) = m/(p.r). Rc(t) (1- Rc(t)/(p.r)),   (4)   
which, together with (3) gives : 
 R c(t+l) = q.m/(p.r). Rc(t) (1- Rc(t)/(p.r))   (5)   
Relation (5) represents a typical process where 'chaotic' behavior may occur.  In order 
to bring it to the canonical form we have, as a first alternative, to make the assumption 
that p.r=l. This is actually saying that the share of the demand r that the private 
competitors may hope to cover is inversely proportional to the price p which they use 
on the market, which represents a sensible conclusion. 
We have that q.m = w is the parameter we have discussed above regarding the 
outcome of chaos.  Considering the limits emerging in the dynamics and focusing on 
the relation between the monopolistic parameter m and the privatization parameter q, 
we have: 
q.m<l, the phase curve will lay bellow the 450 line in the first quadrant; and the 
process will show a tendency of private revenue extinction. 
1<q.m<3, there will be a positive value equilibrium point at the intersection of the 450 
line and the parabolic curve; the private revenue converging to it, as a stable 
state. 
We may notice that: 
1<q.m<2, the phase curve slope at the intersection point will be positive; 
2<q.m<3, the slope will be negative but less than unit in absolute value; 
q.m>3, the slope will be less than -1; the private revenue will start oscillating, 
experiencing first various doublings of the period, then passing to a chaotic 
regime. 
Analyzing how this translates into considerations on the privatization rate q it results 
easily from the inequalities above that: 
q<(l/m) gives an extinction of the privatization process; this representing a lower limit 
to the privatization bellow which it is inefficient to pursue it. 
 (1/m)<q <(3/m) gives an interval where the private revenue will converge to a stable 
value.  Since this value will increase with the privatization parameter value 
going up, there is a strong tendency toward a fast privatization. 
(3/m)< q; beyond this limit the private revenue starts oscillating tending to a very 
complex ('chaotic') behavior, thus, seemingly unpredictable. 
Figure 6 is synthesizing an image of the behavior described. Institute of Economic Forecasting 
 





   
Figure 6 
Privates penetrating the monopoly dominated market 
 
•  If now we consider equation (5) and, instead of putting the condition p.r=l, we 
re-scale Rc as R=Rc/(pr) we obtain: 
(6) R=(q.m/(p,r)).R(l-R)   
Next, we will present the numerical data resulted from analyzing the historical data in 
the power sector of Romania, where RENEL, the local monopoly, was corporatized 
(into CONEL) and is now on the way to being unbundled and privatized. 
Numerical data - The Romanian case 
In Romania, the Electrical Energy Authority (RENEL) was generating around 96% of 
the electricity and 40% of the heat required by the economy. 
Considering the 1989-1996 data on the sales of electrical energy for low, medium, and 
high voltage and the total revenue of the public utility presented in the Appendix 1, we 
may determine the value of m and the one of w=(q.m/p.r). 
These values result from a parabolic regression of the data R[M$]=R(Q[MWh]) and 
R(t+l)=f(R(t)). 
The resulting values are: m = 0.047 [$/kWh] and w = 1.61. 
The conclusions drawn are the following:  
1. Since w = 1.61 > 1, we have the confirmation that it was a good time, in 1998, to 
have private entities penetrate the power generation.  
2. Considering that the fraction of the private supply of electrical energy (r), is the 
same with the fraction of private income (q), hence that (q/r)=1, we have the 
following limits for the price p of the private suppliers of electricity in a hypothetical 
privatization of the energy domain.  Considerations on the Reform in the Power Sector 
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2.1. q/r *m/p < 1 => p>m;  p>0.047 [$/kWh] extinction of privates; from a 
technological prospective the prices of energy from combined cycle plants were 
significantly lower. 
2.2. 1< (q/r*m/p) < 3 => 0.016<p<0.0468 [$/kWh] penetration by the private 
suppliers of the energy market; 
2.3. q/r*m/p > 3 => p<0.016 [$/kWh] the penetration of the private suppliers may 
oscillate in a chaotic manner hardly controllable by the energy policy makers 
(and by the regulator).  This price limit is given by the nearly 25% of hydro-
generation existing in Romania. (e.g., in Brazil the average power prices went 
to even lower values from 1992 to 1998). 
Conclusions 
The important conclusions resulted from the approach developed above are 
underlining: 
a)  The fact that the benefits of competition are balanced by the costs of the 
increased complexity of the market. There exist an optimal number of players in 
the market giving a minimum price to the clients. In various markets where, for 
example, there is too much unbundling, the trend of the market would be toward 
merging to reach the optimal structure. (Poland may be an example of this sort 
these days). 
b)  The process of privatizing monopolies, especially in the economies whose 
structures are rapidly changing, may lead to complex dynamic regimes 
("chaotic"), uncontrollable by the policy makers. 
c)  The privatization rate is bounded both bellow and above: too slow leads to 
extinction of the privates, while too fast leads to chaotic regimes liable to 
produce shocks on a low resilience economy. The penetration of too many 
privates may reach a point when the shock would not be sustainable any more 
and ‘chaotic’ regimes may show up mainly at the commercial and financial 
levels. (The situation of the IPPs in Pakistan, in 1998, may be a relevant 
example). 
d)  The safe price range for the consistent penetration of the privatization is 
determined for the case of the electricity production in Romania. By keeping the 
power prices within these limits the regulator may achieve the smooth change 
in the power sector which avoids the unbearable shocks to the economy. As the 
market evolves these limits may change. 
e)  The existence of an optimal market structure (number of entities for a minimum 
price to the clients) and of an optimal time path (giving a minimum shock to the 
economy) may create a basis for the design of a power market and of its 
regulatory framework before a natural monopoly is broken. This possibility 
shows that one-large-step approach is the best provided: (i) the path trajectory 
from monopoly to market, and (ii) the target structure of the market are the 
optimal ones. Thus subsequent shocks are eliminated and the path is smooth. Institute of Economic Forecasting 
 





   
Appendix  1 
Comments on regulation 
The regulatory aspect is very important to the market. Regulation, as our paper 
shows, has to enhance the competition balancing between the short range and the 
long range players in the market. From the point of view of the market player’s action 
range, regulation is usually associated with the short range action, while deregulation 
is associated with letting longer range players compete in the local markets.  
There are significant opportunities for gains in deregulating power markets. Table 1 
below shows (J.L.Guasch and R.W.Hahn, 1997) the electricity prices in Europe and 
the United States. To the extent these prices reflect incremental costs, there are likely 
to be significant gains from reducing entry barriers into different markets. For example, 
strict regulations in Germany require domestic companies to purchase electricity from 
regional producers, even though lower cost power is often available nearby. The 
extent of the potential gains for consumers is difficult to estimate, but in the United 
Kingdom, energy deregulation resulted in a 70% increase in productivity and an 18%-
21% reduction in franchise contract prices (Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, 1996).  The absence of similar deregulation in other European 
Union countries has led to firms paying over 50% more for their power than do their 
American counterparts. Moreover, the impact of higher energy prices on the overall 
economy can be quite significant. For example, (Navarro, 1996) a 30% increase in 
electricity prices tends to raise the price of goods such as paper and pulp, metals, 
chemicals and glass by roughly 2.5%.  
Table 1  
Effects of too much (protective) energy regulation in the European 
Community (cost rounded to the nearest cent per kWh) - source 
Electricity Association Services Ltd., 1996 
Country  Cost Country Cost 
Germany 12  France  7 
Italy 10  Netherlands  7 
Portugal 10  United  States  7 
Belgium  9 Greece 7 
Spain  9 Denmark 6 
Britain 8  Finland  6 
Luxembourg 8 Norway 5 
Ireland 7  Sweden  4 
Appendix  2 
Earlier dynamic models 
The roots of the economists' interest in complex dynamics are to be found in the non-
mathematical literature on business cycles, with its large number of models,  Considerations on the Reform in the Power Sector 
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undertaking to provide a set of conditions sufficient to generate oscillatory behavior in 
economy. 
In the 1930's, the work of Frisch (1933), Lundberg (1937) and Samuelson (1939) 
started using difference and differential equations in models that generated 
deterministic time paths. 
A non-trivial example is Samuelson's multiplier accelerator model (1939), which is 
made up of the three standard relationships: 
Yt= Ct + It      Ct = cYt + k      It = b(Yt-1 - Yt-2) 
where Y is national income (output), C is consumption, c is the marginal propensity, 
and I is investment.  The C equation is a linear consumption production with a one-
period lag.  The investment function is a linear lagged accelerator with investment 
assumed proportionate to the preceding period's rate of growth of the output.   
Substitution of the latter two equations into the last one yields 
Yt = (C+b)Yt-1 - bYt-2 + k 
which is Samuelson's second order linear difference equation. 
Out of these types of model four qualitative behaviors were generated: 
1.  oscillatory and stable (i.e., converging with oscillations of decreasing amplitude 
toward some fixed equilibrium value); 
2.  oscillatory and explosive (cycles with divergent amplitude); 
3. non-oscillatory  and  stable; 
4. non-oscillatory  and  explosive. 
It was soon recognized that linear equations of an even higher order than 
Samuelson's would not generate time paths any different from the ones above.  This 
range of possible time paths configurations simply was not sufficiently rich for the 
economists' purposes, since in reality time paths are often more complex and many 
oscillations do not seem to explode or dampen toward disappearance. 
A solution, brought to attention by Hicks and Goodwin, was the nonlinear modeling, 
considered of a general form: 
yt = f(yt-l,...,Yt-h ) 
Responding to real economic issues these authors, for example, showed that such a 
non-linear model can yield a stable limit cycle toward which all possible time paths of 
the variable Yt converge.  This is where matters were left, the work stopping short of 
introducing a degree of non-linearity sufficiently great to generate chaotic behavior. 
Essentials of chaotic behavior 
In essence, the chaos theory shows that a simple relationship that is deterministic but 
non-linear, such as a first order nonlinear difference equation, can yield an extremely 
complex time path.  
Inter-temporal behavior can acquire an appearance of disturbance by random shocks 
and can undergo violent, abrupt qualitative changes, either with the passage of time or 
with small changes in the values of the parameters.  Chaotic time paths can have the 
following attributes, among others: Institute of Economic Forecasting 
 





   
a)  a trajectory (time path) can sometimes display sharp qualitative changes in 
behavior, like those we associate with large random disturbances (e.g., very 
sudden changes from small amplitude to large amplitude cycles and vice 
versa), so at least some tests of randomness cannot distinguish such chaotic 
patterns of change from "truly random" behavior; 
b)  a time path is sometimes extremely sensitive to microscopic changes in the 
values of the parameters which can completely transform the qualitative 
character of the path; 
c)  they may display in a bounded region an oscillatory pattern which is very 
"disorderly". 
Chaos theory provides, both for the economic analyst and for the policy designer, 
warnings that apparently random behavior may not be random at all, demonstrating 
the dangers of extrapolation and showing the difficulties that can beset economic 
forecasting generally. 
Complex cyclical patterns 
The simplest and most common chaos model involves a nonlinear one-variable 
difference equation of first order, that is, one of the form: 
yt+1 = f(yt) 
whose graph (the phase diagram) showing f(yt) as a function of yt is hill shaped and 
tunable; in other words, the height, steepness, and location of the hill can be adjusted 
as desired by a suitable modification in the values of the parameters of f(yt), This 
phase diagram is the geometric instrument used to analyze the chaotic behavior time 
path generated by a difference equation model. 
The function most commonly used to illustrate the chaos phenomenon is the quadratic 
equation with a single parameter, w 
yt+l = f(yt) = wyt (1-yt) ; where dyt+l /dyt = w(1-2yt) 
There are different behaviors of the path in the phase-space for the same starting 
point yo and for various values of w. 
As may be seen from the equation if 
w<1 the phase curve will lay bellow the 45
0 line in the first quadrant; 
w>1 there will be a positive value equilibrium point at the intersection of the 45
0 line 
and the parabolic curve; 
1<w<2 the phase curve slope at the intersection point will be positive; 
2<w<3 the slope will be negative but less than unity in absolute value; 
w>3 the slope will be less than -1. 
The last case is the one when the chaotic behavior may set in after a number of 
frequency bifurcation of the emerging limit cycles (from 2 frequencies to 4 frequencies, 
etc.). Since, for example, Grandmond and Malgrange (1986) and Baumol and 
Benhabib (1989) are giving extensive descriptions of the phase space of this equation 
for the economic dynamic case.  Considerations on the Reform in the Power Sector 
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